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Introduction
In this paper we analyze the bargaining problem of an incumbent …rm and a union when a collectively agreed upon wage contract becomes the minimum wage in the entire industry. This is typically the case in Germany, where collective wage agreements between a union and an employers' association can be made compulsory even for independent employers through socalled extension rules. 1 In contrast to previous works on raising rivals' (wage) cost strategies we analyze the case where labor costs are mainly …xed operating costs. We consider a market with an incumbent …rm and an entrant …rm. The employees of the incumbent …rm are represented by a union, while none of the workers of the entrant …rm is organized. The incumbent …rm and the union bargain about a collective wage agreement. We compare two labor market regimes depending on whether or not the agreed upon wage becomes generally binding for all employees in the industry. Our results highlight the raising rivals'cost incentives of both bargaining parties (the incumbent …rm and the labor union) when an extension rule is in place. When …rms'wage bills constitute …xed costs, then generally binding (minimum) wages become an extremely e¤ective deterrence device such that even a more e¢ cient rival can be deterred from entering the industry.
Our main application is the Deutsche Post case which nicely highlights the parties'incentives and the consequences of labor laws which make collective agreements generally binding. In Germany, the Posted Workers Act of 1996 allows the Federal Ministry of Labor to implement minimum wages in certain service industries, as e.g., postal services. In contrast to minimum wage legislations in other countries, minimum wages in Germany are based on existing collective contracts which are typically the outcome of negotiations between the established industry union and incumbent …rms (organized within an employer association). The Federal Ministry of Labor can then decide to declare such an existing collective contract generally binding. Quite obviously, that procedure tends to neglect new and entrant …rms' (and their employees') interests. And even worse, the procedure of declaring collective wage contracts generally binding may be used strategically by the incumbent players to directly harm entrant …rms. This is exactly what 1 German labor market institutions and extension regulations are decribed in Haucap et al. 2006 . Below we identify the key elements of labor laws in Germany which implement industry-speci…c minimum wages via extension regulations.
2 happens in the Deutsche Post case.
Our paper is related to Williamson (1968) who showed that an incumbent …rm may accept high wage rates if this also raises rivals'costs (see also Haucap et al. 2001) . Precisely, Williamson (1968) analyzed the so-called Pennington case and he argued that an industry-wide wage contract which increases the cost of relative labor-intense …rms to a larger extent than the costs of relative capital-intensive …rms can be used to force labor intensive …rms to withdraw from the market. Quite generally, the raising rivals' cost literature assumes that the strategic variable (as, e.g., a generally binding minimum wage rate) impacts directly on …rms'variable costs (see Sche¤man 1983, 1987) . In those settings a necessary condition for making a raising rivals' cost strategy pro…table is that the rival …rms' labor productivity (in the case of wage being the strategic variable) is smaller than the …rm's labor productivity which executes the anticompetitive practice. As a consequence, overall productive e¢ ciency may very well increase as the more productive …rm gains market shares while less productive …rms lose market shares.
Our analysis of a setting where labor costs are …xed costs reveals that a raising rivals'costs strategy may also be pro…table when rival …rms are more e¢ cient. Hence, the adverse e¤ects of labor laws which make wages generally binding are likely to be more pronounced when …rms' labor costs are …xed.
We also examine how the presence of wage extension regulations impacts on the entrant …rm's incentives to invest into its mail delivery network which determines the entrant's coverage. We show that an entrant may never invest into building up its own delivery network irrespectively of the e¤ectivity of its investment cost function. If investments take place, then an entrant will enter with a network which entails a smaller coverage when compared with the case without an extension rule. Hence, besides more standard (static) anticompetitive e¤ects, minimum wage legislation unfolds additional adverse dynamic e¤ects on the entrant's willingness to invest into the coverage of its own mail delivery network.
Our paper contributes to the literature which analyzes the interplay between monopolized labor markets and oligopolistic product markets ("unionized oligopolies"). Since Dewatripont (1987, 1988) and Horn and Wolinsky (1988a,b) this literature has been focusing on both the properties of the union-…rm bargaining problem and labor market institutions. Accordingly, our model delivers new insights on the nature of union-…rm bargaining when labor costs are …xed 3 costs and the e¤ects of labor laws which make wage contracts generally binding.
Our paper is related to the literature on entry barriers (Dixit 1979) . Most importantly, we extend the paper by Rogerson (1984) who shows that under symmetric cost conditions a dominant …rm has incentives to raise …xed entry cost. In Rogerson (1984) the level of …xed entry costs is exogenously given, while in our analysis the …xed labor costs of operating a mail delivery network are the outcome of negotiations between the union and the incumbent operator.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the set-up of our model and in Section 3 we derive and compare the industry equilibria depending on whether or not an extension regulation is in place. In Section 4 we examine how the di¤erent labor market regimes a¤ect the entrant's incentives to invest into the coverage of its mail delivery network. Section 5 describes the legal foundations of collective bargaining in Germany and the regulations which transform collective wage agreements into generally binding minimum wages. Section 6 provides an extensive discussion of the Deutsche Post case which highlights the raising rivals' cost incentives and their consequences when the collective wage agreement becomes generally binding.
Finally, Section 7 concludes.
The Model
We assume an incumbent …rm i = 1 and an entrant …rm i = 2. We think of the …rms as postal network operators which o¤er mail delivery services. The incumbent …rm operates a delivery network by employing a …xed volume of mailmen services, 1 > 0, which guarantees a certain mail service quality (e.g., maximum delivery transit times). Hence, the incumbent's labor costs of operating its mail delivery network are …xed costs which are independent of the overall mail volume. For a given wage rate w 1 , the incumbent's total labor costs are then given by 1 w 1 .
In addition, the incumbent's (non-labor) marginal costs of mail delivery service are given by
With regard to the entrant …rm's costs we also assume that labor costs for operating its own delivery network constitute …xed costs with 2 w 2 . 2 The entrant has (non-labor) marginal costs 2 We focus on competition between delivery network operators. By that we abstract from the issues of access regulation which may counter competitors'incentives to set-up own delivery networks (as, e.g., in the UK where relatively low access prices prevail). See Armstrong (2008) for a model of optimal access prices in postal service of c 2 = c + , where stands for the relative cost e¢ ciency of the entrant …rm. The relative cost e¢ ciency of the entrant increases with lower values of . We suppose that the entrant …rm's mail delivery network is more e¢ cient when compared with the incumbent …rm's delivery technology, so that 1 2 holds (we measure the relative network e¢ ciency of the entrant by the ratio 2 = 1 1, where a lower value indicates a higher e¢ ciency level).
We assume a linear inverse demand for mail services p(X) = a X, with a > c, where X := x 1 + x 2 stands for the sum of mail services o¤ered by the incumbent, x 1 , and the entrant …rm, x 2 , respectively. Firms determine their mail service supplies x i (e.g., through outlets and sorting capacities) which are perceived as homogenous by consumers. 3 In the following it is useful to de…ne := a c.
All workers of the incumbent …rm are represented by a union which maximizes the wage bill L = w 1 1 of its members. We suppose that all workers in the sector have the same reservation wage 0 (which is typically determined by unemployment bene…ts). We assume collective wage bargaining between the incumbent …rm and the union. The union's disagreement point is then given by 1 . We apply the Nash bargaining solution to solve for the wage settlement (Nash 1950 ).
Workers of the entrant …rm are assumed to be not organized in a union. Hence, in the absence of an extension rule, the entrant is able to hire workers at their reservation wage .
We consider the following two stage game: In the …rst stage, the incumbent …rm and the union bargain about the wage rate. In the second stage, the incumbent and the entrant simultaneously determine their mail volume capacities (i.e., compete à la Cournot). 4 We distinguish two labor market regimes depending on whether or not an extension rule is in place. If no extension rule exists, then the entrant …rm pays the reservation wage to its employees while the incumbent bargains with the union about the wage rate, b w 1 , which only markets.
applies to its own employees. In contrast, if an extension rule is in place, then the entrant …rm must pay the (minimum) wage, w, which is determined jointly by the union and the incumbent …rm.
At this point some more general remarks are helpful to specify a meaningful parameter range for our linear model. Let us denote the net revenue of …rm i by
Suppose a unique interior Nash-Cournot equilibrium (x 1 ; x 2 ) exists with
As products are homogenous, di¤erences in …rms'equilibrium quantities only depend on and are independent of the wage rate. Quite generally, in a Cournot duopoly model increasing the relative cost e¢ ciency of one …rm leads to a relative increase of the …rm's equilibrium output;
i.e., @x 1 =@ > 0 and @x 2 =@ < 0 holds, with x 1 = x 2 at = 0. 5 We specify that x 2 ( ) > 0 and x 1 ( ) > 0 holds for all admissible , so that the range of is restricted to an interval which guarantees strictly positive output levels for both …rms.
Denote now the optimal net revenue of …rm i under duopoly by
where the superscript "D" stands for the duopoly outcome in the product market). As we assumed constant marginal costs, we obtain dR D 1 =d > 0 and dR D 2 =d < 0, with
Our approach implies that the wage rate only a¤ects …rms' pro…t levels but not optimal quantity choices. We assume that workers'reservation wage is su¢ ciently low such that R D 2 2 > 0 holds. For all admissible , this assumption ensures that the entrant …rm always …nds it pro…table to enter the market whenever it pays the reservation wage to its employees operating the mail delivery network. Similarly, we assume that R D 1 1 > 0 holds for all admissible , so that the incumbent operates with a strictly positive pro…t if it pays the reservation wage under duopoly. This assumption also ensures that the joint surplus of the union-incumbent relationship is strictly positive implying, in turn, a negotiated wage strictly larger than workers' reservation wage.
Given that an extension rule exists, the entrant …rm must pay the generally binding wage rate, w, which is the outcome of bilateral bargaining between the union and the incumbent …rm.
Clearly, as long as the entrant's net revenue R D 2 is not smaller than its …xed labor costs, w 2 , the entrant will enter the market. We denote the limit wage, where R D 2 = w 2 holds, by e w.
Note that d e w=d < 0 and d e w=d 2 < 0 which says that the limit wage decreases as the entrant's cost e¢ ciency or its network e¢ ciency decreases, respectively.
If w e w, then the entrant does not enter the market and the incumbent realizes the
(where the superscript "M" stands for the monopoly outcome in the product market). Note that R M 1 is independent of both and w. We now invoke the assumption that
which guarantees the existence of a limit wage e w which leaves the incumbent with a strictly positive payo¤ at the limit wage. This assumption guarantees scope for entry deterrence as, otherwise, the incumbent would always be better o¤ under the duopoly outcome.
Taking these considerations together, we can formulate the following assumption which we maintain throughout the entire analysis.
Assumption 1. We invoke the following parameter restrictions.
i) 2 ( ; 2 ) which ensures that both …rms' equilibrium quantities are strictly positive, whenever the entrant …rm enters the market.
ii) < min
o which ensures that both the incumbent and the entrant …rm make strictly positive pro…ts if they pay the reservation wage to their employees.
iii)
which guarantees that the incumbent's pro…t is strictly positive at the limit wage, e w.
Part iii) of Assumption 1 mirrors the fact that entry deterrence is in principle possible as the incumbent realizes monopoly net revenues which are larger than the wage bill at the limit wage.
This constellation is guaranteed by imposing an upper limit on the relative network e¢ ciency of the entrant. However, the share the incumbent may get from the realized monopoly revenues may be quite small when the limit wage becomes large.
Equilibrium Analysis
We …rst analyze the equilibrium when no extension rule is in place. Then, we turn to the case where an extension rule makes the wage agreement between the incumbent and the union generally in the entire industry. Finally, we compare the results under both labor market regimes.
Bargaining without extension rule. We …rst analyze the equilibrium when no extension rule is in place. The pro…t functions of the incumbent and the entrant are given by 1 = ( X)x 1 w 1 1 and 2 = ( X)x 2 w 2 2 , respectively, from which we obtain the …rst-order conditions 2x 1 x 2 = 0 and 2x 2 x 1 = 0, and hence, the optimal quantities
In the absence of an extension rule, the entrant pays the reservation wage to its workers. Hence, the entrant …rm's equilibrium pro…t
We now turn to the …rst stage of the game, where the union bargains with the incumbent …rm about the wage rate w 1 . We apply the Nash bargaining solution which requires that the joint
2 is shared equally relative to the union's disagreement point 1 (the incumbent's disagreement point is zero). Hence, the equilibrium wage bill, b w 1 1 , must ful…ll
The following proposition follows immediately from solving Equation (2) for the wage rate, b w 1 , the incumbent's pro…t and the union's wage bill.
Proposition 1. Suppose that no extension rule exists. Then the entrant …rm always enters the market, pays its employees the reservation wage and realizes the pro…t level b
2 . In equilibrium the union and the incumbent settle on the wage rate
which implies a pro…t level of
for the incumbent, while the union's wage bill is
By Assumption 1, the entrant …rm enters the market with a strictly positive quantity and receives strictly positive pro…ts. Comparing both …rms' pro…t levels (1) and (3), we observe that the entrant typically realize a higher pro…t level than the incumbent. To see this, suppose that both …rms are equally cost e¢ cient (i.e., = 0). Then comparison of (1) and (3) yields
, where the latter inequality holds always as we assumed 1 2 and R D 1 > 1 . The obvious reason for this result is that the incumbent must share its surplus with the union, while the entrant pays its workers'the reservation wage. However, the incumbent's pro…t can be larger than the entrant's pro…t if the entrant's cost e¢ ciency is su¢ ciently small (i.e., positive and su¢ ciently large).
Bargaining with extension rule. In the case of an extension rule, the outcome of the negotiations between the union and the incumbent …rm determines the minimum wage rate, w, which is binding for all …rms in the industry. With an extension rule in place, …rms' optimal strategies in the second stage remain una¤ected as long as the entrant …rm …nds it optimal to enter the market. This is the case as long as 2 = R D 2 w 2 > 0 holds. However, if the agreed upon wage rate does not fall short of the limit wage, w e w, then the incumbent sets the monopoly output level, x M 1 = =2, and realizes the monopoly net revenues,
in the product market. Depending on the generally binding wage rate, w, the incumbent …rm's pro…t function is then given by
Let us assume for a moment that bargaining only occurs over a certain wage rate. We can then state the corresponding bargaining frontier, ( 1 ), which gives the maximum payo¤ of the union for a given pro…t level of the incumbent as
We, therefore, obtain a non-convex bargaining problem if
holds. Condition (5) requires that the joint surplus under duopoly net of the wage bill at the reservation wage is strictly larger than the joint surplus under monopoly net of the wage bill at the limit wage. In those instances, the incumbent would be able to realize a larger payo¤ under duopoly than under monopoly if it had all the bargaining power.
If, to the contrary, Condition (5) does not hold, then the bargaining frontier is described by
In that case, we obtain a convex bargaining problem.
In the former case, however, we have to use lotteries to "convexify"the bargaining frontier. We do this by allowing for bargaining over a lottery l = ( e w; ; p; 1 p) which chooses the limit wage, e w, with probability p 2 [0; 1] and the reservation wage, , with counter probability 1 p. We assume that the union and the incumbent are risk-neutral. 6
Using the lottery l, we can describe the convexi…ed bargaining frontier by
where the lottery ful…lls
Applying the Nash bargaining solution to the convexi…ed bargaining frontier (6) and noting the union's disagreement payo¤, 1 , we obtain the following proposition which summarizes the bargaining outcome under an extension rule. 
, then the (expected) wage rate is given by
, so that entry is deterred for sure or with probability p .
The …rst part of Proposition 2 follows directly from applying the split-the-surplus rule and taking notice of the corner solution. The second part of Proposition 2 follows from applying the split-the-surplus rule to the convexi…ed problem. In particular, whenever the Nash solution requires to use a lottery, then the lottery must guarantee that the expected net joint surplus is shared equally which gives the condition
from which we obtain p as stated in Proposition 2.
We are now in a position to analyze how the parameters of our model a¤ect the likelihood of a monopoly outcome where the union and the incumbent agree on a minimum wage which deters entry. From Proposition 1 we observe that deterrence for sure depends on the condition R M 1 e w 1 > e w 1 1 being ful…lled. We can rewrite that condition as follows
Di¤erentiation of f ( ) gives @f =@ 1 > 0, @f =@ 2 < 0 and @f =@ < 0.
We can also examine the probability p of entry deterrence which we can rewrite as p =
Di¤erentiation of g( ) yields @g=@ > 0 and @g=@ 1 < 0. It is now straightforward to establish the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Deterrence of the entrant for sure becomes more likely and the probability of a limit wage, p , increases, whenever the cost e¢ ciency or the network e¢ ciency of the entrant decreases (i.e., or 2 increases, resp.) or the network e¢ ciency of the incumbent increases (i.e., 1 decreases).
Clearly, a bargaining outcome with w e w becomes more likely for higher values of the entrant's marginal costs ( ) and larger (lower) values of the network e¢ ciency parameter 2
( 1 ). Inspection of the probability p which solves the split-the-surplus condition (7) in expected terms, shows that p (i.e., the probability of choosing e w) increases as well when entry deterrence for sure becomes more likely. Interestingly, an increasing value of and a decreasing value of 1 which both shift the extremal point R D 1 1 of the bargaining set outward, induce the bargaining parties to settle on a higher probability of choosing e w under the lottery solution.
Hence, e¤orts of the entrant to enhance its cost e¢ ciency would result in a lower probability of entry (we come back to a similar phenomenon below in Section 4, where we study the entrant's incentives to invest into the coverage of its mail delivery network).
We now ask whether entry deterrence can occur for sure even when the entrant is more e¢ cient. Let us assume for a moment that both …rms have the same network e¢ ciency (i.e., 1 = 2 ). To simplify, let us also assume that workers'reservation wage takes the value of zero.
Entry deterrence then occurs for sure if
Hence, for all 2 [ (2 3= p 2)=4; 0) wage bargaining under an extension rule induces deterrence of a more cost e¢ cient rival.
Let us next assume that both …rms have the same cost e¢ ciency (i.e., = 0) but may di¤er in their network e¢ ciencies ( 1 , 2 ). Again, setting the reservation wage to zero, we then obtain the following condition for entry deterrence for sure:
Hence, with an extension rule existing, an incumbent can deter a rival operator with a more e¢ cient delivery network if 2 = 1 2 (8=9; 1] holds. We summarize those results in the following corollary.
Corollary 2. Suppose = 0. If 2 = 1 = 1, then a more cost e¢ cient entrant is deterred from entry for sure for all 2 [ (2 3= p 2)=4; 0). If = 0, then an entrant with a more e¢ cient network is deterred from entry for sure for all 2 = 1 2 (8=9; 1]. Moreover, when the bargaining parties use a lottery to share their expected joint surplus, then deterrence of a more e¢ cient entrant always occurs with some strictly positive probability.
Comparison of labor market regimes. Comparing the wage rate agreed upon when no extension rule is in place with the case where an extension rule obliges the entrant to pay the minimum wage, we arrive at the following result.
Corollary 3. The (expected) wage rate under a regime with an extension rule is strictly larger when compared with a regime where no such rule exists. Moreover, the union's (expected) wage bill and the incumbent's (expected) pro…t are both strictly larger under an extension rule.
Corollary 3 shows that the usually assumed con ‡ict of interest between a …rm and its union in wage bargaining may be absent in the presence of market entry, whenever the wage rate can be used to raise rivals'costs. In contrast to deterrence models where the deterrence instrument (as, e.g., sunk costs in Dewatripont 1987) di¤ers from the rent-sharing instrument, a minimum wage which combines both functions in a single instrument partly eliminates the supposed con ‡ict.
The reason for this result is that the …rm may wants to deter entry through a relatively large minimum wage which is also in the interest of the union. However, the con ‡ict of interest does not disappear completely as the …rm tries to pocket as much as possible from the monopoly rents.
We conclude the analysis of our model with some remarks on overall productive e¢ ciency as measured by mail unit costs. We compare the labor market regime without an extension rule with the labor market regime with an extension rule. We focus on the case that entry is deterred for sure if an extension is in place. Unit mail cost when no extension rule is in place is given by
If an extension rule exists, unit mail costs are equal to
Inspection of both expressions (8) and (9) reveals the basic trade-o¤ of an extension rule in terms of unit mail costs. As is well-known duplication of …xed costs under duopoly tends to make a monopoly outcome more attractive. However, a monopoly outcome under an extension rule has three main drawbacks: …rst, it reduces total mail volume (x 1 + x 2 > x M 1 ), second, it increases wage demands by the union of the incumbent …rm (w > b w 1 > ), and third, it may deter a more e¢ cient rival from entering the market. Taking those e¤ects together a duopoly outcome might be very well more desirable, even in an industry exhibiting features of a natural monopoly.
To show that overall mail unit cost can be smaller under duopoly in the absence of an extension rule, let us shortly analyze the case of = 0, so that x 1 = x 2 . Using expressions (8) and (9) we obtain the condition
which assures that mail unit costs are smaller under duopoly when compared with a labor market in which an extension rule allows the union and the incumbent to settle on an entry deterring minimum wage. Clearly, such an outcome is more likely the higher the relative network e¢ ciency of the entrant.
Endogenous Coverage
Until now we assumed that both …rms compete head-to-head in the mail delivery market. Both …rms were supposed to provide full coverage and the e¢ ciency levels of their delivery networks were given exogenously. In reality, however, the decision about the coverage of a …rm's delivery network should be endogenous (see Valletti et al. 2002) . Because of universal service regulation the incumbent may not have the choice to reduce its coverage below full coverage. Accordingly, we suppose that the incumbent must provide a full coverage delivery network. We assume that the entrant …rm, however, can decide freely about the coverage of its delivery network.
We abstract from any e¢ ciency di¤erences between both …rms. We assume = 0 and we suppose that the …xed costs of running the mail delivery network are a linear function of each …rm's coverage, s i 2 [0; 1]. The incumbent is assumed to have full coverage with 1 = , while the entrant can choose its coverage level, so that 2 = s 2 .
We assume that the mail demand schedule X = a p is the aggregate of a continuum of symmetric delivery markets with total mass of one. Suppose now that the entrant serves the fraction s 2 of all markets. Then the fraction s 2 of all delivery markets are served by both the entrant and the incumbent, while the remaining fraction 1 s 2 is only served by the incumbent. For expositional purposes, we suppose that the incumbent can discriminate between the duopolistic delivery markets and the markets where it holds a monopoly position.
Given the entrant enters the market in the …nal stage of the game with a coverage of s 2 , the inverse demand in the duopoly delivery markets is given by p D = a (1=s 2 )(x 1 + x 2 ).
Accordingly, the inverse demand in the monopoly segment is given by p M = a [1=(1 s 2 )]y 1 , where x i (i = 1; 2) denotes the …rms'mail volume levels in the duopoly segment and y 1 stands for the incumbent's mail volume in the monopolistic segment.
Solving for the optimal quantities in the duopoly segment we obtain x 1 = x 2 = s 2 ( =3)
which gives rise to net revenues of s 2 R D for each …rm. Accordingly, we obtain for the monopoly segment the optimal output level y M 1 = (1 s 2 )( =2) which leads to net revenues of (1 s 2 )R M 1 for the incumbent …rm.
We suppose that the entrant …rm must incur sunk costs to build up a delivery network in an initial stage before the above analyzed two-stage game starts. We specify that the costs to build up a delivery network with coverage 
from which we obtain the subgame perfect coverage decision of the entrant …rm given by
Clearly, a full coverage outcome becomes more likely, the larger the marginal rents of investment, R D , and the larger the cost elasticity of coverage, 1= .
We next turn to the case when an extension rule makes the wage contract between the incumbent and the union generally binding. We …rst observe that the limit wage is independent of the entrant's coverage decision. As investments into the build-up of the delivery network constitute sunk costs, the limit wage ful…lls s 2 R D s 2 e w = 0 which holds for all s 2 > 0 if and only if e w = (1= )R D . A su¢ cient condition for an entry deterrence outcome is (see Proposition   15 2)
In those instances, the incumbent could realize a larger surplus under an entry deterring wage than under the duopoly outcome at the workers' reservation wage if it had all the bargaining power. Such an outcome becomes the more likely the larger the entrant's coverage becomes as the right-hand side of (11) is monotonically decreasing in s 2 . The condition is, however, never binding, whenever
holds. Incidentally, if Condition (12) holds, then the Nash bargaining solution always requires to use a lottery to resolve the negotiations between the incumbent and the union. 7 We, therefore, obtained the following lemma.
, then entry is deterred for sure and the entrant does not invest into building up a mail delivery network. If, to the contrary, < 2R D R M 1 holds, then entry is deterred with probability p for all s 2 2 [0; 1].
Lemma 1 highlights the power of minimum wages as a deterrence instrument. Given that workers'reservation wage, , and/or the labor-intensity of operating the mail delivery network, , is relatively high, then an entrant …rm will never build up a delivery network if an extension rule is enforced. Comparison with the entrant's optimal coverage decision in the absence of an extension rule (10) shows that there can exist instances in which the entrant would have otherwise build up a full coverage delivery network.
By Lemma 1, the entrant only invests into a delivery network if Condition (12) holds which implies that the incumbent and the union revert to a lottery to resolve their wage negotiations. 
Note that @p =@s 2 > 0, so that the probability of an entry deterring wage increases in the entrant's coverage. Di¤erentiation of the entrant's pro…t function (13) with respect to s 2 yields 7 By Proposition 2, we know that the Nash bargaining solution chooses a point on the convexi…ed part of the bargaining frontier if R M 1 e w < e w which is equivalent to (11) is never ful…lled for all s2 > 0. the …rst-order condition for an interior solution
where the left-hand side is the marginal rent of investment. The left-hand side of Condition (14) is clearly smaller than the marginal rent of investment in the absence of an extension regulation (which is equal to R D ). Two reasons are responsible for this result: …rst, successful entry only occurs with some probability 1 p < 1, and second, the bargaining parties react to an increase of the entrant's coverage by increasing the probability of an entry deterring wage (i.e., @p =@s 2 > 0).
Denote the solution to the maximization problem (13) by s 2 and let us focus on interior solutions, s 2 , when no extension rules exists. The following proposition is then immediate.
, then the entrant does not invest into building up a delivery network under an extension rule. If, to the contrary, < 2R D R M 1 holds, then the entrant invests strictly less under an extension rule when compared with the investment level s 2 for > R D in the absence of an extension rule; i.e., s 2 < s 2 .
Proposition 3 makes clear that for a large enough reservation wage bill, , an entrant will never invest into building up its own delivery network irrespectively of its investment cost function K(s 2 ). Moreover, if investments take place, then the entrant will enter with a network which entails a smaller coverage when compared with the case without an extension rule. Overall, having analyzed a richer model with endogenous coverage we are left with the observation that minimum wage legislation unfolds additional adverse dynamics e¤ects on the entrant's willingness to invest into the coverage of its own mail delivery network.
In the next sections we relate our analysis to recent minimum wage legislation in Germany.
We …rst describe the relevant labor laws which implement minimum wages at the industry-level.
We then examine the Deutsche Post case which highlights the raising rivals' cost incentives when labor laws exist which make the collective wage agreement between incumbents generally binding. Our investigation of that case shows that the main predictions of our model mirror nicely what actually happened in reality.
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The German Collective Bargaining System
In this section we shortly describe the legal foundations of the German system of collective bargaining. We describe the traditional procedure of declaring wage contracts generally binding by means of extension regulation. We then describe most recent minimum wage legislation which has signi…cantly increased the scope for making wage contracts generally binding.
The legal basis of collective bargaining. In Germany wage bargaining occurs mainly at the sectorial level between an industry union and an employer association representing most of the …rms in the industry. 8 Those collective negotiations usually result in standard wages and labor contracts which cover almost all …rms and workers in the industry. This so-called area tari¤ system ("Flächentarifsystem") still dominates the German labor market. As has been argued by Haucap et al. (2006 Haucap et al. ( , 2007 the stability of the area tari¤ system in Germany is mainly externally supported by various labor market regulations which systematically protect the collective bargaining system against deviant behavior and outside competition.
One core institution of the German system of collective bargaining is the so-called tari¤ autonomy ("Tarifautonomie") which empowers unions, employers and employer associations to form coalitions and to bargain collectively. 9 The principle of tari¤ autonomy protects the "social partners"to strike collective agreements on their own and, with that, makes outright minimum wage setting through state intervention virtually impossible.
The legal nature of the collective bargaining process is speci…ed in the Collective Agreements Act ("Tarifvertragsgesetz", in short: TVG). According to the TVG only the tari¤ parties (unions, …rms, and employer associations) can conclude collective labor contracts. Most unions (as the united services union -"Vereinigte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft", in short: Verdi) are organized within the German confederation of trade unions ("Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund", in short: DGB). While there is no doubt that all unions which are members of the DGB have the right to conclude tari¤ agreement, this is typically not the case for outsider unions. 10 In fact, as summarized in Haucap et al. (2006, pp. 365¤.) legal practice and the legal literature have arranged extremely restrictive conditions which have to be ful…lled so that a worker association should be regarded as eligible to conclude collective agreements (see Wiedemann and Stumpf 1977, pp. 357¤.) . 11
The TVG states that in general only members of the bargaining parties are actually bound to obey the regulations of the tari¤ contract. In practice, though, a …rm which is member of an employer association pays the tari¤ wage to all of its employees (for the reasons see Haucap et al. 2006, p. 363) .
Traditional extension rule. While there are many stabilizers of the area tari¤ system, a stabilizer of last resort is provided by the possibility to make collective bargaining contracts compulsory for all unorganized employers (and hence, all unorganized workers) within an industry by an extension rule. Speci…cally, paragraph 5 of TVG provides the bargaining parties with such a device, the so-called "Allgemeinverbindlicherklärung" (in short: AVE). The …rst prerequisite to declare an employment contract to be generally binding is the existence of a collective bargaining agreement in accordance with TVG; i.e., a collective contract between a union and an employer association at the industry level. Secondly, at least 50 per cent of employees in the tari¤ area for which an AVE is initiated have to be employed in …rms of contract-bound employers and the AVE must be "in the public interest".
The implementation of the AVE is regulated in the TVG. Initially, one of the bargaining parties must apply for an AVE at the Ministry of Labor. Unorganized employees and employers concerned, as well as employer associations, unions and the Ministry of Labor of the state a¤ected by the AVE are given the right to express their opinion. Afterwards a public hearing of 1 0 The case of the Christliche Gewerkschaft Metall (CGM) which is a member of the Christliche Gewerkschaftsbund (CGB) is instructive in this regard. Ever since its appearance, the dominant union Industriegewerkschaft Metall (IGM) (which is member of the DGB) has continuously tried to challenge the right of the CGM to strike collective agreements (see Haucap et al. 2006) . Yet, right from the beginning it was clear that the act could also be used to force all employers (including nonorganized domestic …rms) in a certain sector to adhere to the same working standards and, in particular, minimum wages. In fact, as of today the Act's main purpose has become to enforce minimum wages in several service sectors on domestic …rms. In the following we …rst describe the road towards the introduction of minimum wages in the postal sector in Germany just prior to full liberalization. Then, we describe how the minimum wages a¤ected competitors'businesses and we touch on the legal disputes which followed. Table 1 provides an overview of the results concerning the prevailing wages. Subsidiaries of PIN in smaller towns and rural areas often could neither be preserved nor sold to other …rms and had to shut down operations all together.
Turning to the other main competitor TNT, the picture is somewhat di¤erent. Right after the introduction of minimum wages, TNT announced that it is seriously considering withdrawal from the German market as a consequence of the minimum wage. Interestingly, TNT decided not to pay the minimum wages but kept its own lower wage rates e¤ective. This decision, though, did also put an additional …nancial burden on the company as it had to build up reserves for the wage di¤erential and associated social security contributions. However, shortly after the Federal Administrative Court's judgement that the minimum wages are void TNT announced new plans to extend its area coverage and delivery frequency. The Federal Labor Ministry appealed and on January 28th, 2010, the Federal Administrative Court ("Bundverwaltungsgericht") …nally judged the declaration of the minimum wage void due to formal defects. In its decision the court argued that the Federal Labor Ministry had failed to give other a¤ected parties the opportunity to comment prior to issuing of the ordinance. As a consequence, the minimum wage immediately was not binding anymore for the plainti¤s, while 
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it remained in force for unorganized competitors.
There is, however, still uncertainty whether the minimum wage decree is valid from its beginning. To make things even more complicated on February 13th, 2009, a new amendment of the Posted Workers Act was put into force which should cure the Act's shortcomings when more than one collective contract has been concluded in the same sector. First, the amendment speci…es a new "representativeness" criterion which should guide the Federal Labor Ministry's decision which tari¤ contract to select as the basis for an extension rule when more than one collective contract exist. Second, the amendment incorporates a procedure of hearings of the a¤ected parties into the Act which was missing in the former version. Those amendments have been acknowledged by legal experts as su¢ cient to guarantee that a minimum wage based on the collective contract between Verdi and AGV Postdienste could stand the test of a labor court (see Blanke 2007) .
The new amendment is closely related to Verdi's accusation that the new union GNBZ is not empowered to conclude collective labor contracts. Verdi argued that the GNBZ does not meet the minimum standards a "tari¤-enabled" union must ful…ll according to the TVG. 31 On October 30th, 2008 the Cologne Labor Court ("Arbeitsgericht") denied that the GNBZ is a tari¤-enabled union in the sense of the TVG. Accordingly, the wage contract between AGV Neue BuZ and GNBZ was declared as void by the court. This court ruling together with the Federal Government's political commitment to …nd ways to implement minimum wages has been in ‡icting considerable uncertainty on the viability of the competitors'future businesses. Both GNBZ and AGV Neue BuZ appealed against the court ruling, but in the meantime both parties withdraw their appeals.
Conclusion
In this paper we analyzed how minimum wage legislation in the form of extension rulings can be used by collective bargaining partners to deter entry or to drive existing competitors out of the market. Our main application is the postal service industry where the labor costs of running a 3 1 See Blanke (2007) for an expert's report which argues that the new union should not be regarded as tari¤-enabled according to the TVG. That study also argues that the "representativeness" criterion of the revised Posted Workers Act requires to neglect the competing collective agreement.
27 mail delivery network are mainly …xed operating costs. As it is the case in more standard raising rivals'costs models where wages a¤ect a …rm's marginal labor costs directly, wage increases can be used to monopolize the …nal product market. However, there are several di¤erences between raising rivals' marginal and raising rivals' …xed labor costs. Most importantly, when labor constitutes …xed costs, then the pro…tability of a raising rivals'costs strategy does not depend on a su¢ cient e¢ ciency advantage of the incumbent …rm (which engages in the anticompetitive practice) vis-à-vis potential competitors. This observation has several implications. First, the alleged con ‡ict of interest between the …rm and its union becomes less pronounced as it is the case when wages are variable costs. When wages are variable costs a wage increase not only distributes rents to the union but also tends to reduce the overall joint surplus available because of the well-known double mark-up problem. Second, when wages are …xed costs then an incumbent is able to deter entry through strategic wage increases even if the entrant …rm is more e¢ cient. As a consequence, overall productive e¢ ciency can be reduced under a raising rivals'…xed labor cost strategy.
We also showed that extension regulations may have adverse e¤ects on competitors'willingness to invest into the coverage of their mail delivery networks. In the extreme case, entry is completely deterred under an extension rule while an entrant may build a mail network with full coverage when no such extension regulation exists.
The Deutsche Post case reveals the strong incentives of the incumbent …rm and the established union (which cares only about its organized members employed by the incumbent) to settle (strategically) on a relative high wage rate so as to harm competitors. The strategic intention becomes obvious when one considers the fact that the tari¤ contract specifying the proposed minimum wages was made contingent on being declared generally binding by the Federal Government. As we have shown, both parties retained the right to terminate the agreement otherwise.
We also described recent legal disputes which resulted from the Federal Government's minimum wage ruling. The most problematic issue has become the fact that the incumbent unions (namely, the unions organized in the DGB) lost their monopoly position in the "market for collective contracts."This is a rather new development in the German labor market, and the labor institutions (which were designed for bilateral wage negotiations between a monopoly union and 28 a monopolistic employer association at the industry-level) are still struggling to come to terms with a competitive labor market.
